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The articles in this second special issue of the International Journal of Sociology of Ag-
riculture and Food on private agri-food standards consider key issues involved in 
the shift from government to governance within agri-food systems. The first special 
issue, published in February 2013, focused on ‘the contestation, hybridity and the 
politics of standards’ (Bain et al., 2013, p. 1). The articles in the first issue compli-
cated our understanding of the relationship between public and private standards 
by examining the politics associated with their formation, implementation, and out-
comes. At the same time, the first special issue drew attention to the diversity of 
private standards, and the spaces that exist – or get created – for actors to contest the 
values, content or outcomes of such standards. These are important themes, revisit-
ed in the second special issue. However, the concern with the politics of standards is 
extended through more systematic attention to the relationship between standards, 
certification, and the governance of agri-food supply chains.
Governance as a concept focuses our attention on understanding the diverse 
tools, techniques, and activities through which actors, especially retailers, influence 
and coordinate production and consumption within agri-food value chains (see Hig-
gins and Larner, 2010a; Bain et al., 2013). Private, voluntary standards are a particu-
larly significant technique of governance in the agri-food sector. Such standards are 
claimed not only to overcome the limits of state capacity to regulate food supply 
chains in an increasingly globalizing world, but also in response to the willingness 
of the state to delegate regulation to private actors and multi-stakeholder initiatives 
(Ponte et al., 2011a). Yet, far from a complete retreat of the state, scholars see the 
use of private standards in combination with public or quasi-public regulation as 
an example of re-articulated regulation (Utting, 2008; also see Ponte et al., 2011a). 
Re-articulated regulation draws attention to the ways in which whole sectors are 
now being governed through standards and these ‘standards mark a governance 
field characterized by a complex configuration of deregulation and different modes 
of re-regulation. It is a political field that poses itself as de-politicized’ (Ponte et al., 
2011b, p. 289).
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Despite a broad body of literature that recognizes the importance of standards in 
agri-food supply chain governance, certain key issues require further research. One 
growing area of inquiry within the agri-food governance literature is the discur-
sive and organizational mechanisms through which private standards and standard 
setters achieve and maintain legitimacy (Bain et al., 2013, p. 4). Private standards 
are developed in settings that do not require open and transparent dialogue among 
affected parties.1 Understanding how private governance tools such as standards 
and certification, and new governance forms such as multi-stakeholder initiatives 
(MSI), are negotiated, legitimated and settled is critical for advancing efforts to en-
sure that standards are more equitable, democratic and participatory. In addition, 
understanding why some standards or certification schemes ultimately fail provides 
valuable insights for thinking about creating change within global agri-food chains. 
The first two articles in this issue, Maki Hatanaka and Jason Konefal’s analysis of the 
Leonardo Academy’s Sustainable Agriculture Standard Initiative and Ed Challies’s 
examination of private voluntary social standards, focus on the legitimacy of private 
standards.
Hatanaka and Konefal’s article ‘Legitimacy and Standard Development in Multi-
Stakeholder Initiatives: A Case Study of the Leonardo Academy’s Sustainable Agri-
culture Standard Initiative’ explores the legitimacy, or the failure to achieve legitima-
cy, of private standards developed through MSIs. The authors note that ‘non-state 
market driven (NSMD)’ standards tend to be developed through one of four mecha-
nisms: individual firms, industry associations, non-governmental actors, and multi-
stakeholder initiatives (MSIs). Of these four, Hatanaka and Konefal argue that MSIs 
are emerging as the primary mechanism for the creation of NSMD standards. This 
is because the process of standard development within MSIs is seen by stakehold-
ers as more legitimate than other forms of standard development due largely to the 
perception that other mechanisms of standard development are biased toward par-
ticular interests (e.g. retailers).
Utilizing the framework of Tamm Hallström and Boström (2010), Hatanaka and 
Konefal view legitimacy as having three distinct, but interrelated processes: input, 
procedural, and output legitimacy. They note that it is assumed generally that there 
is a positive relationship between these three processes; in other words, that posi-
tive legitimacy for any one of them contributes to positive legitimacy for the others. 
Instead, they find that in the case of the standard developed by the Leonardo Acade-
my’s Sustainable Agriculture MSI, positive input legitimacy may actually contribute 
to weakened procedural and output legitimacy. In this case, the standard lacks out-
put legitimacy because too many actors with differing opinions on input contributed 
to a watering down of the standard and because key actors opted out of the process 
during contentious negotiations.
In ‘The Limits of Voluntary Private Social Standards in Global Agri-food Sys-
tem Governance’, Challies questions the social value of private standards, includ-
ing those developed by MSIs, arguing that all such standards are prone to capture 
by powerful corporate interests. Focusing explicitly on voluntary private social 
standards (VPSSs), he argues that despite some localized benefits of VPSSs, such 
as smallholders being guaranteed a fair price for their produce, which is the case 
for Fairtrade, their value and promise should be judged according to their capacity 
to address the broader social inequalities and injustices that characterize the global 
agri-food system. Specific to agri-food systems, Challies argues that VPSSs tend to 
work best when applied to relatively simple agri-food chains for unprocessed or 
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semi-processed products, such as fresh produce, coffee or cotton, which have been 
produced historically under highly unequal and abusive conditions. In these cases 
there is great value, particularly for retailers, in the ‘saleable story’ of commodity 
production under fair and sustainable conditions. In contrast, processed products 
(e.g. canned goods), which operate within more complex agri-food chains and are 
much more numerous than unprocessed commodities, are less likely to have social 
criteria attached to the label. Or, if they do, it is much more difficult to trace and 
verify compliance to such criteria by the various businesses along the processing 
chain. Thus, the localized benefits of VPSSs for a relatively small number of growers 
and rural communities should be seen in the context of the negative social impacts 
engendered through a company’s sourcing of far greater quantities of products that 
do not have VPSSs.
Furthermore, Challies notes that the capture of VPSSs by corporate interests and 
MSIs means that issues of global poverty and inequality tend to be depoliticized 
and the boundaries of legitimate action and discussion on these issues restricted, 
especially by states. Together, these factors work to preserve the dominance of capi-
tal over states and civil society. Challies concludes that the corporate co-option of 
private sustainability standards demonstrates that the realm of sustainability gov-
ernance is one that should not be left to the market. The inability of VPSSs to fun-
damentally transform relations of production and exchange in the agri-food system 
towards a system that is more just, equitable and sustainable suggests the continued 
need for public standards and regulation. There are also other issues raised that 
extend beyond the need to achieve legitimacy. The next five articles in this special 
issue turn their attention to the tensions and contradictions that emerge with the rise 
of private agri-food standards.
One contradiction that several scholars in this special edition focus on is the con-
cern over whether standards actually accomplish their intended purpose. In this 
collection of articles, Amy Trauger and Andrew Murphy’s examination of organic 
banana production and consumption and Carolina Toschi Maciel and Bettina Bock’s 
analysis of animal welfare standards reveal the contradictions that emerge from the 
development and implementation of private standards. These works also bring to 
light the growing recognition in the standards literature that the complexity of is-
sues at stake may have reached the limits of calculability and governability through 
standards (Higgins and Larner, 2010b; Ponte et al., 2011b).
In ‘The Moral Equivalence of Global Commodities’, Trauger and Murphy focus 
on the ways in which supranational certification schemes and the standards within 
these schemes make certain aspects of the organic supply chain legible while ob-
scuring other aspects. Similar to Challies’s critique that the positives of VPSSs may 
not actually outweigh the negatives, the authors explore how fair trade and organic 
standards are enacted in the Dominican Republic banana production process. The 
Dominican Republic is among the largest producers of organic bananas and ships 
more than a third of their bananas (by volume and value) to the UK annually. They 
then compare this empirical data with UK consumer beliefs and understandings of 
organic and fair trade bananas.
The authors find that farmers are meeting the required standards that allow them 
to sell their product as certified organic and/or fair trade. However, producer efforts 
to capture the short-term price premiums associated with organic and fair trade are 
creating potentially negative long-term consequences for the environment (due to 
the intensification of organic production) or worker protection (due to the changing 
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visa status of workers and the lax enforcement of worker rights among smallholders) 
that are inconsistent with the values generally associated with organic standards.
In addition, corresponding with other agri-food studies focused on standards, the 
authors find it is often large-scale producers (as opposed to small-scale producers) 
that are best positioned to comply with the fair trade and organic standards. In sum, 
they conclude that for consumers of organic/fair trade labels ‘what has ostensibly 
not been in the product, may not actually outweigh what now is in the product’ (em-
phasis in the original). In other words, the very reasons consumers purchase fair 
trade and/or organic products may be negated by the consequences of intensified 
banana production; for example, forcing farmers to use fungicides to deal with Black 
Sigtoka disease and thus pushing them out of the organic market. Moreover, con-
sumers may assume all labels are equal, even when they are not. Despite the short-
comings of fair trade and organic supranational certifications, Trauger and Murphy 
argue that these will remain critical for the sale of organics globally, even if the labels 
are not fully delivering on the values they promise.
In ‘Modern Politics in Animal Welfare: the Changing Character of Governance 
of Animal Welfare and the Role of Private Standards’, Maciel and Bock analyse and 
call attention to what they consider to be the ambivalent consequences of the shift 
in governance of animal welfare standards in Europe. Utilizing a political moderni-
zation framework they explore the changes in animal welfare governance from a 
state-centred to a market-centred policy domain. This shift has allowed non-state 
actors to participate directly and be involved actively in the development of animal 
welfare policies, which has created new collaborations and unexpected coalitions. 
Maciel and Bock conclude that the establishment of new coalitions of actors, the 
mobilization of resources, the redefinition of rules of the game and the enactment of 
new animal welfare discourses provide new opportunities for using the market to 
achieve animal welfare. However, there are also reasons for concern.
First, given the imbalance of power among agri-food chain actors and the possible 
undemocratic institutional design of private standard systems, it can be questioned 
whether political modernization within animal welfare benefits all actors equally. In 
addition, it raises the question of what types of standards and rules are likely to be 
generated within these circumstances. Maciel and Bock argue that food retailers are 
more powerful than their suppliers; thus, transnational food retailers are in a posi-
tion of choosing which actors to include in a coalition, which discourses and rules 
of the game to enact and, ultimately, of directing animal welfare governance in a 
manner that serves their interests best. Harkening back to issues raised by Hatanaka 
and Konefal, Maciel and Bock argue that it is inappropriate to assess the private gov-
ernance of animal welfare based on output legitimacy. The effectiveness of output 
legitimacy, they argue, ‘cannot be measured objectively without prior democratic 
processes that guarantee that (all) affected stakeholders can participate in the defini-
tion of an “effective outcome”’. Thus, the authors conclude that a shift from govern-
ment to governance in the case of animal welfare produces an ambivalent effect, 
because transnational food corporations acquire the capacity to act as ‘quasi-states’, 
while their actions lack the democratic legitimacy of state actions.
Maciel and Bock’s conclusions also point to another area of inquiry within the 
governance of agri-food chains. In reality not all private standards require estab-
lishing or maintaining legitimacy. If a private retailer imposes standards that actors 
must subscribe to in order to participate in the value chain, then there is little need 
to study legitimacy. Rather, attention shifts to focusing on the ways in which actors 
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continue to assert their autonomy, despite the imposition of private standards on 
the governance of agri-food chains. Several authors in this issue reveal the ways in 
which the enactment of standards is a negotiated process, which affords farmers, 
activists, consumers and other actors opportunities for agency not always recog-
nized in the literature. In particular, Jennifer Wiegel’s analysis of a global retailer’s 
procurement of tomatoes in Nicaragua, and Rebecca Schewe’s article on the deci-
sions of New Zealand dairy farmers and processors regarding organic certification, 
both focus on the ways in which actors continue to assert their autonomy, despite 
the governance of the chain through private standards.
In ‘A New Breed of Tomato Farmers?’, Wiegel highlights the ways in which the 
procurement of tomatoes in Nicaragua by a transnational food retailer, Ahold/
Walmart, does not fully fit with the existing agri-food studies and standards litera-
ture. The literature has suggested that the success of transnational supermarkets 
depends on the effective localization of their operations in each new country. While 
Ahold/Walmart has successfully localized operations in Nicaragua they did so in an 
unconventional manner. Utilizing a supply chain management (SCM) lens, Wiegel 
reveals that rather than sourcing tomatoes from the existing 4,000 tomato farmers, 
the transnational supermarket created a ‘new breed’ of tomato farmer, who is new 
to tomato production.
Wiegel’s study calls into question the existing literature that assumes transnation-
al supermarkets will source their products from more capitalized farmers. Instead, 
she argues that the willingness of farmers to comply with new supermarket procure-
ment requirements and standards, in addition to their ability to comply with them, 
must be taken into consideration. In the case of Nicaragua, existing tomato farm-
ers resisted complying with supermarket procurement strategies, opting to contin-
ue selling to the wholesale market that dominates Nicaragua. Thus, new farmers 
were identified by Ahold/Walmart for tomato cultivation. Interestingly, these new 
tomato farmers not only organized their production systems differently (e.g. differ-
ent varieties, year-round production), they also had very different social organiza-
tions of production (e.g. use of labour and financial resources). She concludes that 
the creation of vertically coordinated supply chains by transnational supermarkets 
produces not only a differentiated product, but also a differentiated set of costs and 
benefits of insertion in the chain, making it difficult to compare across chains as well 
as to switch from one to another. Far from simply figuring out how to buy tomatoes 
and get them on supermarket shelves, transnational food retailers have established 
coordinated supply chains that fit their needs. While this process may be unique to 
Central America, it does suggest that the sourcing of fresh fruits and vegetables in 
the region is undergoing change and current arrangements are far from stable.
In ‘Negotiated Decision-Making: Understanding Farmer and Processor Certifica-
tion’, Schewe asserts that through the framework of negotiated decision-making we 
can understand better the factors influencing how farmers and processors choose 
between competing certification systems. Drawing on ethnographic interviews with 
New Zealand organic dairy farmers and processors, she argues that factors shaping 
certification choices include financial and ideological motivations, social networks, 
existing practices, and position in the value chain. In other words, using a negotiated 
decision-making framework allows for a better understanding of both the structural 
constraints and individual motivations shaping a farmer’s selection of specific or-
ganic certifying schemes.
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Schewe discovers that the need for market access and regulatory ease of proces-
sors leads them to be motivated by previous auditing relationships with certifiers, 
and the degrees of perceived professionalism and the extent of government affili-
ation among certifying bodies. On the other hand, graziers generally have smaller 
profit margins that make it difficult to balance both financial and ideological mo-
tivations in choosing certifiers. Since graziers are unable to reconcile the financial 
and ideological tensions, she finds that they often allow their certifications to lapse, 
whereby going with a more affordable, but less ideologically agreeable organic cer-
tifier is avoided. Ultimately, by developing a clear theory of producer/processor 
decision-making Schewe asserts that there is ‘empirical significance for other envi-
ronmental and social outcomes of private agri-food standards’ in addition to theo-
retical implications for understanding the roles of the state and market in governing 
environmental and social goods.
A third area of inquiry when focusing on the shift from government to govern-
ance in the agri-food chain is the degree to which private regulation incorporates or 
usurps public regulation. Stewart Lockie, Anne McNaughton, Lyndal-Joy Thomp-
son and Rebeka Tennent’s comparative case studies of GLOBALG.A.P. engage with 
the role of public versus private regulation within agri-food chains. In ‘Private Food 
Standards as Responsive Regulation: The Role of National Legislation in the Devel-
opment and Evolution of GLOBALG.A.P.’, Lockie et al. challenge the predominant 
argument that private standards fill a regulatory void created by the retreat of the 
state. Instead, the authors use three case studies from Vietnam, the Philippines, and 
Australia to show how private standards, such as GLOBALG.A.P., can be more ap-
propriately characterized as a form of responsive regulation. According to Ayres 
and Braithwaite (1992), state regulation can be understood as a pyramid of enforce-
ment ranging from ‘command and control’ mechanisms, whereby the state enforces 
compliance through disciplinary sanctions, to ‘responsive regulation’ approaches 
that rely on voluntary, market-based mechanisms to ensure compliance. Responsive 
regulation reflects the fact that contemporary states feel compelled to respond to 
perceived needs for government regulation and therefore continue to play a critical 
role in its implementation. While responsive regulatory approaches can appear at 
times independent of the state, they in fact operate within the legal apparatus of the 
state.
In the case of Vietnam, the authors find that the state has supported the implemen-
tation of the international private food standard GLOBALG.A.P., and a national food 
standard, VietGAP, largely in response to the international development community 
providing support for these endeavours. Here, Vietnamese state agencies worked to 
embed GLOBALG.A.P. standards within the state’s regulatory framework for food 
safety. Nevertheless, despite the interest in GLOBALG.A.P. the actual number of 
certified producers in Vietnam is small and concentrated in industries where sub-
stantial technical and financial support has been provided. In the case of the Philip-
pines, multiple certifications (e.g. ISO 22000, GLOBALG.A.P., PhilGAP-FV) with no 
one regulatory agency actually taking responsibility has led to a situation where the 
desired outcomes of any one standard may not actually occur and, in some cases, are 
almost entirely absent, such as in environmental or labour regulations. In Australia, 
growers face a large number of competing private and state standards for certifica-
tion in order to participate in domestic and international markets. Rather than view 
private standards as imposing additional requirements on them, growers argue that 
GLOBALG.A.P. standards are often redundant because they are simply variations of 
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legislative requirements that are already in place. In addition, growers felt that many 
GLOBALG.A.P. standards are unnecessary or insensitive to the local social context 
in which agricultural production operates, such as the assumption that the children 
of family farmers are highly exploited through child labour. In conclusion, the au-
thors reveal that private standards, such as GLOBALG.A.P, are best understood as 
a form of responsive regulation whereby the state plays a critical role in facilitating 
their implementation and in allowing such standards to flourish. However, the au-
thors also warn that responsive regulation can create opportunities for the concen-
tration and abuse of authority among non-state regulators within specific conditions 
(e.g. where state regulatory capacity is low).
In conclusion, similar to the first issue, all the authors in this volume raise con-
cerns over democratic participation in the development and implementation of 
private standards (despite efforts to have the process appear participatory and in-
clusive). While actors throughout the value chain may have opportunities for the 
performance of agency, these opportunities are constantly in flux and often threat-
ened, especially as transnational food retailers expand their power over the agri-
food system. Certainly, consumers and social activists are demanding standards that 
can ensure a more just and equitable agri-food system. Yet, several articles in this 
issue, particularly Challies’s analysis of social standards and Trauger and Murphy’s 
analysis of organic and fair trade bananas in the Dominican Republic, suggest that 
social and environmental goals will continue to be undermined as long as the inter-
ests and values of capital are privileged over those of workers and farmers within 
the value chain and civil society more broadly.
Note
1. While it is assumed that public standards are developed in more democratic settings than private 
standards, Kimura (2013) observes in the case of the development of radiation standards post-Fuku-
shima, that the standards developed by a non-profit in Japan were more democratic and transparent 
than corporate and government developed radiation standards.
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